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Emergency
Feed Grain storage
for New England
By William J. Hanekamp and Stan ley K. Seaver
Depa rtment of Ag ricultural Econom ics and Aural Sociology

Introduction
Over the last 20 years the formula feed manufacturing industry of New
England has been plagued by a series of rail shut downs. In the middle 1950's,
severe winter storm s crippled rail service for weeks; in 1969 harsh winter conditi ons in co mbination with rail union disputes stalled rail service for months;
and in 1977, 1978. and 1979, lon g-haul rail service was paralyzed. Each of
these crisis periods caused significant disruptions in the production schedules
of the region's formula feed industry. In ve ntories of many feed ingredients
were drained, feed production schedules were altered, and deliveries of mixed
feed to poultry and dairy farmers were delayed for extended periods.
The di sruption s which characterized the feed production process during
these acute winter seasons underline a major co ncern among public and
private members of New Eng land's agricultural communit y. There is a growing belief that agri culture can no longer depend on the regional feed manufacturing industry to unilaterally execute emergency feed processing plans. The
costs of guaranteeing an emergency flow of feed ingredients and mixed feed to
livestock producers are rising, which places a greater financial burden on individual firms. As a result , attention is now focu sing on alternative system s to
insu late the grain trade from further breakdowns of transportation services.
The objectives of thi s study focus on three critical areas of the reserve
storage issue. They include: (1) determinat ion of the existing grain storage
capacity of the mixed feed manufacturing industry of New England, (2) determination of the ability of the industry to in sure itself a steady supply of grains
and feedstuffs to co ntinu e feed manufacturing operations , and (3) identificati on of the alternatives available to the industry to achieve a satisfactory
reserve storage capability.
1

FEED INGREDIENT STORAGE IN
NEW ENGLAND, JANUARY 1, 1977
The commercial feed mixing industry of New England maintains an in gredient storage capacity of approximately 107,000 tons. This capacity
represents silos and other enclosed facilities used to stock livestock feed inputs.
Among the ingredients stored are whole corn, hominy, soybean meal, mid dlings, brewers grain, millers grain, and gluten feed.
Storage capacities for the region show significant variations by stat e.
Maine and Connecticut, for example, account for 70 percent of the regions
total capacity. With a significant poultry industry operating in the two states,
they represent the principle storage areas for whole corn. In contrast the state
of Rhode Island maintains limited storage capacity. With no major commercial feed mixing plant operating in the state, storage in Rhode Island is con fined to those agribusiness firms serving as wholesale or retail finished feed
outlets (Table I).
TABLE 1. Feed Storage Capacity in New England, By States, January 1, 1977.

Commercial Feed Mixing Plants' Storage Capacity
Other Grains

Total

........................ to n s ........................

·tons·

41,841

7,146

48,987

3,100

14,348

17,448

10,328

6,195

16,523

Connecticut

20,936

3,164

24,100

NEW ENGLAND

76,205

30,853

107,058

Siale

Maine
Vermont
Massachusettsl
New Hamps hire

Corn

Rhode Island

Source:

Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plants -

April 1977.

Seasonal Storage
During the calendar year the levels of feed ingredients held in storage
fluctuate. The seasonal shift in storage is, in part, a product of the size of the
individual firm. Feed mixing plants with limited storage capacities generally
maintain supplies near capacity throughout the year. More variable storage
utilization is practiced by plants with large storage capacities. Typically these
larger enterprises show acute cyclical shifts in the use of storage capacities during the year.
Figure 1 illustrates the standard storage utilization patterns of New
England feed mixing plants. For the majority of the firms with capacities
2

Figure 1.
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under 4,000 tons, inventories average 85 percent of capacity and seldom were
allowed to fall below 70 percent. Stocks below the 70 percent level generally
were a product of di sruptions in normal operating procedures. For firms with
storage capacities in excess of 5,000 tons, the utili zat ion of faciliti es ranged
from 45 to 90 percent. There were only a few exceptions to this pattern . The
excep tions were generally recorded by th ose firms with storage capacities of
5,000 to 7,000 tons with milling capacities of 400 tons per day. Their cyclical
shifts in storage occasionall y dipped to 60 percent of capacity.
Although storage patterns fluctuate by size of operations, the majority
of feed mixing plants fu lly utilized their storage facilities during late November
through the end of February. In terms of total volume. it represented an in ventory on hand of 91,000 tons for the region (Table 2). The accumulation of this
TABLE 2. New England Feed Production And Ingredient Storage Position 1977.

State

Total
Storage
Capacity

Estimated
Supp lies
in Storage

Average
Weekly
Demand for
Finished Feed

Supplies Avallable to Support
Production
Schedu les

Winter

Winter

·································tons·················................

·days·

Maine

48,987

41 ,639

15,952

18.3

Vermo nt

17,448

14,831

10,060

10.3

Massachusett sl
New Hampshire

16,523

14,045

8,761

11.2

Connecticut! Rhode Island

24,100

20,485

10,182

14.1

107,058

91 ,000

44 ,955

14.1

NEW ENGLAND

Source: Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plans -

April 1977.
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vo lume was a response in part to (I) the availabi lit y of fa ll harvest supplies in
the midwest, and (2) the difficulties of keepin g feed procuremen t chann els
open during the emire winter season.
Even with feedstuff reserves at optimum storage levels , it st ill represents
a lim ited supply of feed ingredients. Weekly produ ction schedules for examp le
req uire 45,000 tons of ingredie nt s to be all ha nd. At this level sup pli es in
storage can guarantee ingredient demand for no more than 14.1 day s.
Th e inventory reser ve position , however, varies significant ly among the
indiv idual states of New Eng land. fn the win te r season , feed mi xers in Ver·
mont , for example, can maintain produc tion sc hedules for te n da ys, th e lowest
in New England. In con trast the largesl feedst uff reserves are held in Ma ine
with 18.0 days supp ly . For Co nnecticut, inventories held in the winter are suf·
ficiem to support feed mixing schedu les for 14. 1 days.

Rail Service to New England
T he shipment as we ll as the storage of feed ingredients represent s a
critical component in the manufacture of li vestoc k feed in New England . For
over fou r decades the dom in a nt mode of tra nsporting feed in gredie nt s into the
region has been rail. It represents the primary link from the grain supply
cen ter s of the Midwest to eastern users.
Movement of feedstuffs travels over a variety of railroad ro ut es. T he
primary roules eastward include the direct link from Toledo, Ohio, to New
Eng land, and the northern route connecting Detroit, Michigan, to Mont real,
Canada. Through the years the service over these nort heastern routes has been
subject to breakdowns and transit delays. Under nor mal service conditions,
grai n shipment s eastwa rd require 7 to 14 days to reach their destination po int s.
However. t here have been numerou s occasio ns when feed mixing firm s have
experienced t ransit delays of 25 to 32 days (Table 3).
TABLE 3. Railroad Delivery and Delay Time Recorded by New England Feed Manufac turers.

Stal e

Normal
Transit
Time

Ma ximum
Transit
Time

Unexpect ed
De lays in

Shipments

....... ...................................... days ·········· .................................. .

7·10
14

32

22·25

30

New Hampsh ire

10·12

30

16
18·20

Massac husetts

7·10

30

20·23

7· 10

25

15·18

Mai ne
Vermon t

Rhode Island
Connec tic u t

Source: Survey of New England Feed Ma nu fa cturing Plan l s -
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April 1977.

The cause for such delays is due to a host of rail movement and service
factors. Among the most common are misclassification of rail cars at switch·
ing yards, limited availability of hopper cars at supply points, delays in
transferring cars from terminal yards to receiver spur tracks, and periods of
unseasonably bad weather which disrupt s normal rail operations. The threat
of these unexpected delays holds importanl implications to the maintenance of
normal finished feed production schedules. Occasional delays in feedstuff
shipments will not cripple mixing operations. But if the frequency of delay
becomes acute, supplies in storage become a critical factor in maintaining con·
tinuous mixed feed production schedules.
Extended breakdowns in rail service can create a serious feed shortage in
New England since each state maintains a limited inventory of feed ingredients
to service its livestock economy. Extended delays paralleling those shown in
Table 3 show the potential for feed ingredient shortages in New England . No
state maintains sufficient feed ingredient reserves to supply its local normal
mixed reed market (Table 4).
TABLE 4. Maximum Delays, Storage Supplies and Periods of Shortage.

State

Maximum
Transit
Delays

Storage
Supplies
Available
Winter

Periods
of

Shortages
Winter

············································days······ ......................................
Maine

25

18.3

6.7

Vermont

16

10.3

5.7

Massachusetts!
New Hampshire

20

11 .2

8.8

Connecticutl
Rhode Island

18

14.1

3.9

Storage Requirements - A New Perspective
With the potential of rail service breakdowns extending for periods of 25
to 32 days, (Table 3), the existing storage capacities of the region's formula
feed mixing industry are inadequate. A review of the finished feed production
schedules, based on 1975 demand, shows the need for an additional storage
capacity of 40,100 tons (Table 5) to guarantee an emergency reserve during
periods of acute and extended rail service shutdowns. Of the individual states,
Maine recorded the highest storage needs, 15,200 tons. The state of Vermont
required 8,200 ton s of additional storage capacity, Masachusetts/ New Hampshire 11,000 tons and Connecticut 5,700 tons of reserve storage.

5

TABLE 5. Additional Reserve Storage Capacity Required to Eliminate Potenlial
Shortages.
State

Storage Capacities
·tons-

15,200

Maine

8,200

Vermont
Massachusellsl
New Ham psh ire

11.000

Con nec ticu tl
Rhode Island

5,700

NEW ENGLAND

40,100

1977 -

A CASE STUDY

In the winter of 1977, the Northeast exper ienced an acute breakdown in
rail service. Heavy snows and ice curtailed operations in key switching yards
(Cleveland, Ohio; Buffalo. New York; and Montreal, Canada), and stall ed th e
movement o f traffi c along numerous mainlin e routes. It resulted in extended
dela ys in the arrival of goods to numerous industrial and agricultural
custo mers. Delays in service paralled those hypot hesized in the preceding section .
The breakdown in rail service to New England's feed mixing plants was
most severe during late January and early February. Thousands of tons of feed
ingred ient s were tied up on railroad track s. With these rail shipment s paralyzed, local feed mixing mills rapidly exhausted their supplies of feed in gredient s. Production schedules were revised and altered to combat the service
delay, but many feed mixing firm s still experienced critical shortages.
The extent of the in gredient shortages varied signifi cantly between states
as shown in Table 6. In Vermont, for example, local mills experienced shortages of at least one majo r feed ingredient. These ingred ients were either completely depleted or fell below 10 percent of normal sto rage levels. The periods
of shortages ranged from 7 to 30 days. For the states of Maine, Massachusett s,
and New Hampshire, report s of inventory shortages equal to 10 percen t of
normal stocks ranged from 4 to 14 days. Connecticut feed mixing firm s,
however, were more fortunate. Inventories of feedstuffs never fell below 30
percent of normal levels. It must be noted that thi s inventory in reserve was
still low. It only represented a s ix ~day supply of ingredients.
The shortages in feed ingredients forced man y firms to undertake
emergency actions in the winter of 1977 . Trucking of ingredients from alte r ~
6

TABLE 6. Storage Required to Prevent Feedstuff Shortage in the Winter 011977.

Ingredient Reserve Storage
Slate

Corn

Soybean

Soft Grains

Total

··············································· ton s··· ........................................... .
Mai ne

11 ,700

1,600

Vermont
Massachuset t sl
New Hampsh ire

2,200

15,500

12,600

12,600

3,030

270

5,700

9,000

14,730

1,870

20,500

37, 100

Connecticut!
Rh ode Island

NEW ENGLAND

So urce: Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plan s -

June 1977.

nat ive so urces of suppl y. rerouting of railcars, subst itution for depl eted ingredient s, limiting customer orders and transferring of ingred ient suppli es among
neighbo ring plants became necessary to continue production schedules. These
adjustments enabled the feed mixing firm s of Verm ont, New Hampshire, Co nnec ticut, and Massachusetts to mix feed rations th roughout the crisis period.
For Maine, however, plants were less effective in maintaining productio n
sc hed ul es. Approximately 50 percent of the commercial feed mixing plants of
the state were temporarily sh ut down. The periods in which plants ceased feed
mix ing operations varied from one shift to four days. The depletion of sup plies of whole corn (yellow No. 2), a major feed ingredient in poultry ratio ns,
was the primary factor in the decision to shut down.

The Economic Impact
The burden of maintaining livestock feed productio n schedules fell entirely on the formula mixed feed manufacturing industry. Continuation of
produc tion sc hedules in the win ter of 1977 resulted in increased costs of operatio n for each New England feed mixing plant.
Among the maj or costs incurred by local feed mixi ng firms was th e
und erutilization of labor. A survey of the feed mixing industry showed that
each firm in the region - whether temporarily sh ut down or under limited
production schedules - retained all hired perso nnel on the payroll. The full
crew s were kept on hand in order to respond immediately to the arrival of
delayed rail shipments.
A less visible cost to the feed mixing plant s was the inability to maintain
stand ard formulas. Often high cost ingredients were substituted for lower cost
ingredients to maintain proper nutrient and protein standards. This resulted in
high cost formulations. In general, these added costs were absorbed directly by
the mixing firm.
7

Another component in the scenari o of winter productio n costs was the
procurement of em ergency supplies of feed ingredients . Man y feed mixing
plants shifted from midwestern sources to suppliers in New York a nd Penn sylva ni a for imm ed iate delivery. As a result o f the accele ra ted purc hasin g activiti es , prices of in gredien ts in these two market s rose sharp ly forcing New
England firms to pay premiulll prices . M oreover, New Eng la nd mixers had to
bear the cost of tru cking emergen cy supplies to their plants . Common a nd
wi ldca t carriers were co ntracted fo r the long-hau l move ments from New York
and Penn sylvania .
The act ivities of the firm s in seeking alternative operational strateg ies
howeve r did not spare the indu stry fr om the cost penalties of a crippled
rai lroad industry. Th e fi rm s abso rbed th e costs of tran sit delays o f cars as we ll
as the costs associa ted with rero uting rai l cars to avo id tra ffi c tie-ups. In addi tion approximatel y 80 percent o f the firm s in the regio n were assessed addi tiona l dem urrage fees . The hi gh demurrage charges were direct ly att ributable
to the unex pected arri val of la rge nu mbe rs of rail ca rs at the feed mill ing sites
at one tim e. The feed mi lling fa cilities typ ica ll y were not equ ipped to un load
the lot s o f arriving car s within the prescr ibed unloading times.
It is difficult to q uantify the total dollar costs of all the emergency actions undertaken by [he feed mixing industry. Man y of the costs were no t iden ti fia ble due to th e va riati o n in acco unt ing sys tems used by individual firm s. It
therefore was diffi cult to sepa rate the rea l costs for anal ysis. One major cost
compon ent easily defi ned, howeve r , was the demurrage charged New England
mills.
The estimat ed to tal demurrage charge att ributabl e 10 the di sruptions o f
normal rai l service was approximately $ 160,000 (Tab le 7). For so me firms ,
demurrage was min or while oth ers reported demurrage as high as $50,000_ Th e
plants o f Vermont and Maine absorbed th e larges t share o f this cost. The fees
represent ed the cha rges for the three mo nt h period of Januar y-March. For the
TABLE 7. Demurrage Charged New England and Feed Mixing Firms During January·
March 1977·.

Stale

Demurrage Charged
·dollars·

Maine

59,050

Vermont

65,500

Massac hu sett s!
New Hampsh ire

26,500

Con necticut
NEW ENGLAND

7.900
158,950

• One firm did not re spo nd to th e survey of New Eng lan d mi lls.

Source: Survey of New Eng land Feed Manufac turing Plants -
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June 1977,

majority of firms March was the high cost period due to the queuing problems
of delayed car arrivals. With the lim ited storage and unloading facilities the
cars could not be efficiently handled. In total, these costs represented a signifi cant burden on an industry confronted with an array of financial hardships
due to the inclement weather.
Recovery of Losses

The 1976 tariff regulations did not allow for (he correction of accumulating demurrage costs in the winter of 1977. Provision s within the tariff
in fact placed the burden of the cost directly on the railroad customers. Delays
and tie-ups of rail cars on shipper and receiver tracks were totally the responsibilit y of the railroad users, not the responsibi li ty of the carriers.
Action by railroad users was taken to seek relief from the high demurrage charges. Presentations were made before the In terstate Commerce Commissio n (ICC) requesting (he demurrage costs be shared by the railroad carriers. The ICC responded to the requests of the railroad users in the spring of
1977 . by autho rizing an amendment to the existing tariff regulations. This
amendment provided a 50 percent redu ction in the demurrage fees charged
railroad users. Rate adju stment s reduced the $30 and $20 per day demurrage
levies to $15 and $10 per day respectively. These reductions applied to charges
incurred between late December to mid-March of 1977 .
Establi shm ent of the amendment toadju st the demurrage costs during the
winter of 1977 was only a temporary action. It did not establ ish a policy for
future years. Accordingly, the long-term transportation problems whi ch face
New England' s industrial and agricultural industries still remain.
Expanding Storage Capacity

The establi shm ent of reserve storage of feed ingredients represents an
alternative to combat unreliable rail service. New England, as shown in
previous data, is in a reserve storage deficit position (Tables 5 and 6).
Reserve slorage could be expanded under two plans. The first involves
the utilization of subterminal elevators under a unit-train transportation
system to move grain to New England locations. The second entails the construction of specialized grain storage fac ili ties to function as eme rgency grain
supply centers.

9

SUBTERMINAL RESERVE STORAGE
Examination of the feasibility of developing a subterminal system to service New England's feed grain buyers was undertaken in a separate study entitled "Unit Train Grain Sub terminals To Service New England's Feed
Manufacturing Industry - An Economic and Locational Analysis."! This
work foclised on the economic advantages associated with installing a unit
train transportation service to move feed grain. A byproduct of the total program was the expansion of grain storage throughout New England.
A subterminal facility is an agri-industriaJ complex composed of grain
unloading equipment and grain silos. The operational specifications require
sufficient storage capacity to house grain (corn) in excess of 9,000 tons. It is
the utilization of this storage capacity which improves the reserve storage posilion of a region.
The construction of unit train subterminal facilities in New England will
significantly improve the ability of local feed mixing industry to combat future
feed grain shortages. For the districts of southern New England, central New
England, and Maine, it represents sufficient storage to combat the shortages
recorded in the winter of 1977. A subterminal facility is not economically
feasible for Vermont but reserve storage of 18,000 tons is still needed to combat all potential local grain shortages.

Financial Cost
The capital outlay required to finance the total subterminal project totals
6.5 million dollars. It represents the total investment cost to construct four
facilities to service the local feed manufacturing industries of central New
England, southern New England, Maine and northern Vermont (Appendix 1).
Annual operating expenditures vary according to the volume of grain
which is received and distributed by the subterminal facilities. Volumes of
grain equal to 1975 feed grain import levels place plant costs at 1.55 million
dollars. The cost to distri bute the centrally stored grain to local feed manufac turers totals 1.73 million dollars (Appendix 1).
The overall cost of the grain subterminal project is an invest ment to
reduce the costs of transporting feed grain into New England. Prelimina ry unit
train tariff rates offered by Conrail and Canadian National rail carriers in
June of 1977 placed tran sportation cost savings in the range of the projected
subterminal development and operational costs (Appendix 2). In total the expansion of storage capacity under a grain subterminal collection and distribu tion plan showed no direct cost to the local feed manufacturing industry except
in Vermont.
lUnpublished manllscript. W.J. Hanekamp, The University of Co nnect icut, Storrs Agriculcultural Experimell1 Station, Storrs, Connecticut.
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WINTER RESERVE STORAGE FACILITIES
Unlike the mUltipurpose uses of a grain subterminal facility, a winter
storage facility serves but one function. It serves to store feed grains to combat
potential feed grain shortages. The winter grain storage complex is an insurance investment for the feed manufacturers of New England.
Construction of emergency reserve storage to meet 1977 conditions is required in three districts to service the region's feed mixers. Facilities need to be
located in northern Vermont, Maine and southern New England with a total
storage capacity of 37,000 tons. Reserves of this level would be sufficient to insulate New England against the feed shortages which were experienced in
1977. '

Financial Cost

Construction of district feed grain facilities for winter storage is a capital
intensive program. In order to meet the estimated reserve requirements, the
total silo capacity needed for winter storage is between 34,000 and 37,000 tons.
The construction cost is estimated to range between 2.8 and 3.5 million dollars
(Table 8).
TABLE 8. Estimate Capital Outlay for Winter Silo Storage Facilities, 19771.
State

Estimated Capital Investment - dollars
·minimum·

·maximum·

1,320,000

1,383,000

Vermont

705,000

1,125,000

Massachusetts! New Hampshire

303,000

982,000

2,828,000

3,490,000

Maine

Connecticut! Rhode Island
NEW ENGLAND

1These costs are for facilities at new locations and hence include site, railroad siding,
all new loading and unloading equipment and similar other costs. If storage for 40,000
tons, which includes Connecticut, were built at existing plants, costs would be reo
duced approximately one million doffars. The cost, by states, for providing the volume
of storage indicated in Table 5 is as follows: Maine, $687,750; Vermont, $366,250;
Massachusetts/New Hampshire, $491,250; and Connecticut, $255,000; or a total of
$1,791,250.

The annual costs to operate the facilities include depreciation, taxes, insurance, interest on investment capital, and the interest on the value of the
feedstuffs held in winter storage. Labor costs are minor since skeleton crews
are sufficient to operate the facilities for no more than three months.
The expected short term costs result in estimated annual expenditures
between $533,000 and $686,000 (Table 9). The largest cost component is for
fixed expenditures. Although the facility is not operational during nine
months, March to November, the fixed costs of operation still accumulate.
[Even though Connecticut had no 1977 shortage, additional capacity is required as shown in
Tables 4 and 5.

11
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TABLE 9. Estimated Annual Costs of Operation , 1977, Winter Silo Storage.

Maine
Minimum
Maximum

Cost Categories

Fixed Cost s
Depreciation & Interest
(A.E.C.)
Taxes & Ins urance
Vari able Cost s
Labor
Interest o n In vent o ry 1
8 % per armum
10 % per annum

Total Cost
NEW ENGLAND

Vermont
Min imum
Maximum

Massachu set1sl
New Hampsh ire
Min imum
Maximum

157,320

176,000

77 ,676

135.506

83,287

108,158

51,408

57,512

25,383

44.280

27 ,2 16

35,343

10,400

10,400

10,400

10.400

10.400

10,400

37,400

38,750

19, 750

3 1,500

22, 500

27,500

256,128

282,662

133,209

221 ,686

143, 403

181 ,401

(m i n i m urn -max 1m urn . $352 ,740-685 ,749) 2

3.6 percent of Capita/ Investment. Va fuIJ of Feeds tuffs - $l00/ton - F.O.B. New England)
2 Some additiona l operating costs wo ulo be incurred with buflding emergency storage as indica ted in footnote
Table 8. The se cos ts ha ve not been estimated but would be considerably less than $532.740.

Comparison of Two Alternatives
The cons tru ction of grain subterminal facilities to serve grain traders in
New England is a n economically attracti ve program. It establis hes reserve
storage in the reg ion with a mini mu m direct capi ta l in vest ment. Ah hough th e
direct cost is minimal due to the potential savings which result from the cost
eco no mies of a unit train deli very system , there arc notable organ ization prab·
lerns a ttached to a regional and district subter min a l project.
Under a subterminal program, major changes need to be implemented in
traditional feed purchasing procedures . Firms served by the subterminal could
no longer act independently as buyers in the feed grain market. Instead , each
wou ld need to participate in collecti ve purchasing arrangements with
neighboring firms to guarantee shipment tonnages sufficient fo r a fu ll unittrain. Additionally, purchase arrangements would need to be developed und er
long-term contracts . Many local feed manufacturing firms are reluctant to accept centrali za tio n of purchasing activities.
New England firms view the individual freedom to speculate on price
cycles, flu ctuations and trend s in the mark et place as an impo rtant factor in
developing a success ful bu si ness. Loss o f fre edom reduces th e managerial
competition a nd skill which is a n integral part of the feed manufacturing
business. Few wish to eliminat e it as a pro fit -earning instrument. Potential
profit earnings due to timely grain purchases ca n easily offset any transporta tion cost reductions that result from a unit train tariff rate . This dichotom y in
economic advantages creates a notable barrier to the acceptabilit y of a subterminal project by individual firm s withi n New England.
In contrast, the winter silo program offers great flexibility in developing
a procurement and storage program . Movem ents of feed grain int o the reserve
storage facilities are not tied to la rge volume shipments. Moreo ver shipments
o f one car or multi -car loads can be received and unloaded at the facility. Such
fl exibilit y offers firms the freed om to enter the grain market to take advantage
of time and location price variations. There is no requirement to contract with
a ce ntral supplier who can guarantee large volumes for delivery.
Providing reserve storage at central locations, however, st ill remains a
capital intensive project. There exists a direct capital and operation cost to the
region but, as noted, thi s can be minimized by localing storage at existing feed
mixing plants . The acceptability of either alternative rests on the method s of
financing and the development of support from federal and state agencies.

Summary
Storage facilities presently utilized by the formula feed mixing industry
a re inadequate to house an emergency supply of ingredient materials. Evidence
shows conclusively that an expanded storage capability is required in New
England . Estimated additional storage requirements total 40, tOO tons : 15,200
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tons in Maine, 8,200 tons in Vermont, 11,000 tons required for Massachusetts
and New Hampshire combined, and 5,700 ton s for Connecticut.
The economic feasibility of establishing emergency storage was reviewed
under two plans. One entailed the use of unit train grain subterminals as
reserve storage centers. The alternative plan examined the feasibility of utilizing storage silos as district emergency storage sites. Capital requirement
estimates were also made for storage located at existing plants.
Under the plan to construct district silos to house emergency stocks,
capital investment requirements range from 2.8 to 3.5 million dollars, at 1976
prices. Expected annual costs to operate the elevators varied from a low of
$533,000 to a high of $686,000. In tcrms of a premium cost to guarantee an
emergency supply for the region, it represents a maximum cost of $0.35 per
ton based on 1975 feedstuff consumption requirements.
Reserve storage requirements, however, are significantly reduced under
the plan to establish grain subterminal elevators to service grain shipments by
unit train. The daily operation of these facilities insured the feed mixing industry a reserve of 23,600 tons in subterminal storage. Accordingly this reserve
in conjunction with the existing storage capacity can service emergency feed re quirements in southern and central New England, and Maine. Additional
capital investments, however, are required in Vermont. A 1.8 million dollar
capital outlay is needed to construct a facility which can offer the local feed
mixing industry a sufficient storage capability. Expenditures to support its
operation result in an annual cost of approximately $121,000 at 1976 price
levels.
Implementation of a reserve storage program in concert with the grain
subterminal system is a cost efficient system. The additional capital outlay reQuired in Vermont represents an annual cost to the region of approximately
$0.07 per ton based on 1975 feedstuff consumption requirements. In comparison to the district silo plan a savings of $0.28 per ton is realized by the
regIOn.
The acceptability of the two plans is also contingent on organizational
parameters. The subterminal project requires the centralization of grain purchasing decisions. As a result the freedom of participating firms to make individual purchasing decisions in response to price variation is curtailed
significantly. The centralization of activities is not as rigid under a reserve
grain program. Individual firms still maintain autonomy in developing and
carrying out purchasing decisions in the grain market place.
Individual firms building emergency storage at existing locations seems
to be the most desirable system. Both capital requirements and operating costs
are minimized. It also retains the greatest amount of flexibility. Government
participation would be required in order to assure access to supplies during
emergencies by firms not building additional storage. The greatest disadvantage is the lack of assurance that sufficient storage will be built to provide protection for all of New England.
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APPENDIX 1
The Economic Structure of a New England Unit Train Grain Elevalor Induslry, 1976.
Capital
Investment

OPERATING COSTS
Distribution Costs
Plant Costs

location

Tonnage

Annual

ATC1

Direct Delivery

Annual

ATC

Shrinkage

Annual 2

Total
Ope rati ng Costs

Annual

ATC

Subterminal
Ope ration

....................................................................... ·····dollars·············· .... · .... ·········· ........ ·· ······ ......................... ..
A ugu sta ,
Me .

477,880

68 1,651

1.43

238,940

2.00

238,940

1,8 78,483

3.93

2,400,000

Fitchburg ,
Ma.

163.956

313,240

1.91

389 ,063

2.37

81,978

784, 282

4.78

1.150,000

W il limanti c,

167,076

315,757

1.89

204,100

1.22

83,538

603,395

3.61

1, 150,000

95.004

245,110

2. 58

183,350

1.93

47 .502

475.962

5.01

t ,800,000

903,916

1,555,758

1,72

1,734,406

1.92

45 1,958

3.7 42,122

4.1 4

6,500,000

Ct.
St. Albans.

VI.
New Eng land

en

1 All A TC's are avera ge tota l cost per ton.
2 Shrinkage cos t is $.50 per ton. To obta in A TC add ATC pfant and ATC de livery cost p lus $.50 or divide annual to tal op era ting
cost by tonnage.

-
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APPENDIX II
Potential Savings Resulting From Proposed Conrail Aates, New England , 19771,
Total Grain
Subterminal

Operaling
Dest ina tion

Cost

Proposed
Unit Train
Rate

Existing
Tariff
Rate2

Economic
Savings

Total
Savings3

·Per Ton-

·Per Ton-

Augusta,
Me.

3.93

12.70

2000

3.37

1.611

W illimant ic .
CI.

3.6 1

11 .25

16.00

1.14

191

Fitchbu rg.
Ma

4.78

11 .25

16.45

.42

69

51. Alba ns,
VI.

5.01

11.05

15.30

- .76

-72

(OOO's)
·Per Ton·Per Ton ................ .............. ................................ Dollars ............................................................. .

10nly savings from Toledo, Ohio are ca lcula ted Sin ce exis ting ra tes from Ft. Wayne, Indiana and
Decatur. Illino Is were not readily available.
2Existing fare as of January 7, 1977.
3TotaJ do llar savings based on 1975 corn shipmen ts of 4 77,880 tons.

